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Abstract This paper investigates how the various changes in
the policy supporting agriculture in the European Union, i.e.
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and various types of
subsidies (investment, production and rural development) af-
fected the technical efficiency and productivity change of
farms in France between 1990 and 2006. Three types of farm-
ing—field crop, dairy and beef cattle—are considered.
Comparison of efficiency across periods indicates a signifi-
cant reduction in efficiency in the period following the first
CAP reform (1992MacSharry reform) but an improvement in
efficiency change. Econometric results related to the effect of
subsidies on efficiency scores (with fixed effect models) and
productivity change indices (with ordinary least squares) give
ambiguous findings. The effect of a particular type of subsidy
was found to be negative or positive depending on the sam-
ple’s production orientation and on the performance consid-
ered. Several methodological recommendations are drawn
from the analysis for future research.
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Introduction
This paper investigates how the various changes in the policy
supporting agriculture in the European Union (EU)—the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—and the different types
of farm subsidies affected the technical efficiency (TE) of
farms in France during 1990–2006.
Over the past two decades, the CAP has undergone major
changes. Three main reforms were undertaken, all with the
objective of modifying the way European farms benefit from
public support. There has been a gradual shift from ‘coupled’
support, i.e. support given per unit of output, to more
‘decoupled’ support, which is not related to production but
given on an area or as income support. The first decoupled
subsidies, namely crop area and livestock direct payments,
were introduced in the first CAP reform in 1992 (the
MacSharry reform), while price support for specific types of
production was reduced. However, these direct payments
were still linked to production decisions, since they concerned
only land sown with specific crops or supporting specific live-
stock types. The first agri-environmental payments (AEPs),
provided to farmers who comply with environmental commit-
ments on a voluntary basis, were also introduced. AEP and
payments for farms located in less-favoured areas (LFA) are
part of rural development payments. In the following reform
in 2000, the so-called Agenda 2000, additional types of crop
area and livestock became eligible for the direct payments,
and rural development payments were strengthened. The
Luxembourg CAP reform of 2003 introduced a fully
decoupled support instrument called the Single Farm
Payment (SFP), which is an income support scheme
provided per hectare under any type of production, or
even for land not in production, but which is dependent
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Theoretically, it is difficult to draw a priori expectations of
the effects of subsidies. Bergström (2000) and Martin and
Page (1983) proposed that subsidies would have a negative
effect on TE as a result of reduced effort by managers. More
recently, and applied to the agricultural sector, Serra et al.
(2008) suggested that risk effects shape the relationship be-
tween subsidies and TE. According to these authors, from a
theoretical point of view, it is not possible to draw unambig-
uous conclusions concerning the connection between subsi-
dies and TE because this depends on farmers’ risk attitudes
and on whether the inputs affected are risk- increasing or risk-
decreasing. Therefore, Serra et al. (2008) recommended
resorting to empirical investigations.
Several papers have analysed empirically how the agricul-
tural subsidies received by farms alter the farm’s TE.
Examples include the following: Giannakas et al. (2001) for
crop farms in Saskatchewan during 1987–1995; Rezitis et al.
(2003) for Greek farms in 1993 and 1997; Hadley (2006) for
eight different production types of farms in England and
Wales during 1982–2002; Emvalomatis et al. (2008) for
Greek cotton farms during 1996–2000; Zhu and Oude
(2010) for crop farms in Germany, the Netherlands and
Sweden during 1995–2004; Zhu et al. (2011) for Greek olive
farms in the period 1995–2004; Nastis et al. (2012) for alfalfa
production in Greece in 2008; Kumbhakar et al. (2014) for
Norwegian crop farms in 2004–2008; and Sipiläinen et al.
(2014) for Finnish and Norwegian dairy farms in 1991–
2008. For the EU’s new Member States, studies include the
following: Bojnec and Latruffe (2009) for Slovenian farms
during 1994–2003; Latruffe and Fogarasi (2009) for French
and Hungarian dairy and field crop farms during 2001–2004;
and Bakucs et al. (2010) for Hungarian farms during 2001–
2005. The general conclusion of existing studies is that the
effect of subsidies on TE is negative. On occasion, evidence of
a positive effect has been given, such as Hadley (2006) who
found a positive impact for the particular case of dairy and
beef farms in England and Wales during 1982–2002. In their
meta-analysis, Minviel and Latruffe (2014) suggested that the
direction of the effect of subsidies on TE depends on the type
of subsidy considered.
This paper aims at contributing to the debate by investigat-
ing whether various types of subsidies have a similar impact
on farms’ TE. Hence, contrary to most of the existing research
which concentrates on either all subsidies received by farms or
on one single type of subsidy, here, we investigate the impact
of three distinct types of subsidies: (i) subsidies to carry out
investments on the farm; (ii) subsidies linked to production;
and (iii) subsidies received under the framework of rural de-
velopment actions.
In addition to investigating the influence of subsidies on
yearly TE, their influence on the change in TE is also inves-
tigated, along with their influence on technological change
and on the resulting total productivity change. This issue has
been investigated less frequently than the TE- subsidy link.
While some studies have focused on assessing the impact of
subsidies on productivity as a whole (e.g. Mary, 2013, Rizov
et al. 2013), few have considered the decomposition of pro-
ductivity into TE change and technological change. In France,
Guyomard et al. (2006) found that, despite the negative influ-
ence of subsidies on yearly TE, the influence was positive on
TE change and total productivity change for all three types of
farms considered (crop, dairy, beef cattle) and on technologi-
cal change for crop farms during 1995–2002. For three other
EU countries (Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden), Zhu
and Oude Lansink (2010) reported a negative effect of subsi-
dies on the TE change of crop farms. Using village-level data
in China for the period 1995–2009, Zheng and Kening (2011)
showed that subsidies had a positive influence on TE change,
technological change and total productivity change.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section ex-
plains the methodology, while Section 3 describes the data.
Section 4 presents and discusses the results, and the fifth sec-
tion concludes.
Methodology
Computation of technical efficiency scores
and productivity change indices
In this research, the non-parametric approach data envelop-
ment analysis (DEA) is used (Farrell, 1957; Charnes et al.,
1978). DEA constructs a piece-wise frontier that envelops
all observations in the sample used, so that the best performing
farms form the envelope (i.e. the frontier) and the distance
from poorly performing farms to the frontier represents their
inefficiency. The further a farm is from the frontier, the less
efficient it is, while farms on the frontier are fully efficient.
Fully efficient farms are given a score of 1, while inefficient
farms have scores lower than 1, with lower scores indicating
lower efficiency.
One advantage of DEA is that it can disentangle TE due
purely to management practices (the so-called pure TE; PTE)
from scale effects (scale efficiency, SE, being the residual
between TE and PTE). The main weakness of DEA is that,
since the farms in the sample are used to construct the
enveloping efficient frontier, results might be affected by sam-
ple bias in such a way that efficiency is overestimated if the
best performing farms of the population are not included in the
sample used. Thus, in this paper, we correct TE and PTE DEA
scores for sample bias using the bootstrap method introduced
by Simar andWilson (1998, 2000). This method simulates the
data distribution by imitating the data generating process. In
practice, the approach relies on creating pseudo-data and
implementing DEA on this new dataset. Repeating these steps
numerous times enables the true distribution to be
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approximated and hence inference results can be produced. It
should be noted, however, that after correction for bias, the
corrected DEA scores are lower than the original DEA scores
(which are overestimated as explained above), and hence, no
farm in the sample still has an efficiency score of 1.
A further weakness of DEA is that the shape of the frontier
and therefore efficiency scores are affected by the presence of
extreme data. For this reason, in our research, prior to any
efficiency calculation, outliers were eliminated using the
method introduced by Wilson (1993). This approach calcu-
lates a log ratio that compares the geometric volume of the
whole dataset to the volume spanned by a subset of data. The
outlier detection method then consists of a graphical analysis,
whereby outliers are identified when the log ratio is high for a
specific subset of data.
The change in TE between 2 years is calculated with the
help of Malmquist productivity indices (Caves et al., 1982;
Färe et al., 1992), corrected for sample bias using
bootstrapping (Simar and Wilson, 1999). These give, for each
farm, the change in total productivity between year t and year
t+1 by comparing the location of the farm with respect to the
efficient frontier in each of the 2 years. The Malmquist (total)
productivity index can then be decomposed into two compo-
nents: the technological change index, which assesses the
move of the frontier over time, and the TE change index,
which evaluates the change in TE. The latter can also be
decomposed into change in PTE and change in SE. Hence,
five productivity change indices are computed here (TE
change index, PTE change index, SE change index, techno-
logical change index andMalmquist total productivity change
index). All indices are interpreted as follows: a value of one
indicates no change, while a value above one indicates prog-
ress or growth. A value below one indicates decrease or
deterioration.
The output-oriented DEA model includes one single out-
put—the value, in real terms, of the farm’s total output in
euros—and four inputs: utilised agricultural area (UAA) in
hectares; total labour used on the farm in annual working units
(AWUs; where 1 AWU corresponds to 2200 h of labour per
year); the value, in real terms, of the farm’s fixed assets in
euros; and the value, in real terms, of intermediate consump-
tion in euros.1 Yearly frontiers are built, and separate frontiers
are constructed for farms with different production
specialisations: crop farms, dairy farms and beef cattle rearing
and fattening farms.
Analysis of the impact of subsidies
When farm-level data are used, the method commonly
employed by researchers to assess the impact of subsidies on
farm efficiency is a regression of efficiency scores on a vari-
able representing the farms’ dependence on subsidies.2 In the
literature, this is proxied either by the value of total subsidies
received, or by the share of farm income stemming from gov-
ernment support, or by a ratio relating the amount of subsidies
to the level of output or gross margin in order to control for
size effects.
Another approach may also be found in the literature.
Instead of an econometric regression, some research has com-
pared the evolution of farm level efficiency across several
periods that differed in terms of agricultural policy (for
example Lachaal, 1994; Paul et al., 2000; Coelli et al., 2006;
Carroll et al., 2009). In the present paper both approaches, i.e.
a comparison of periods and an econometric analysis, are
used.
For the comparison of period approach, we use statistical
tests3 to test the significance of the difference between effi-
ciency means across four different periods of CAP reforms:
1. Period 1, 1990–1994, is the benchmark period, i.e. when
price support was the order of the day and before any CAP
reform.
2. Period 2, 1995–1999, is the period where the effect of the
first CAP reform is investigated (the MacSharry reform
was agreed in 1992, but in France, its full implementation
was completed only in 1995).
3. Period 3, 2000–2005, represents the period following the
second CAP reform (Agenda 2000).
4. Period 4, 2006, is the first year of implementation of the
Luxembourg 2003 CAP reform in France. It should be
noted that this period is not considered in the case of
productivity change indices, since 2 years are necessary
to calculate the indices.
1 Consumer price indices from Eurostat with 1990 as the base year were
used to express all values in real terms (this concerns output, fixed assets,
intermediate consumption and subsidies). The use of the same index to
deflate outputs as well as inputs is based on the assumption that their price
series have similar developments over the period considered, which is a
potentially strong assumption. However, farms are treated equally here,
which is consistent with the idea that they probably face the same price
changes. In any case, using price indices introduces errors since the indi-
vidual prices faced by farms are not known.
2 Simar andWilson (2007) criticised this two-stage approach where DEA
scores are calculated in the first stage and scores are explained in a
second-stage regression. The authors raised the problem of serial corre-
lation among scores and proposed a double bootstrapping procedure to
account for this. However, this proposal has not beenwidely followed and
the literature on the determinants of efficiency still mainly relies on the
two-stage approach. Indeed, Latruffe et al. (2008) showed for a sample of
Czech farms that both approaches (the traditional two-stage approach and
the double bootstrap approach) produced similar results.
3 The tests of comparison used are t tests when the distribution of scores is
normal, and Mann-Whitney tests otherwise. Normality is explored
through Q-Q plots.
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For the econometric approach, determinants of efficiency are
investigated with regressions where the dependent variable is
either the farms’ TE score, or PTE score, or SE score (three
regressions per farm sample).4 Panel data regressions are used,
where individual effects enable heterogeneity across farms and
omitted variables that are specific to each farm and time-invariant
to be accounted for. F tests confirmed that fixed individual effect
specification is preferred to pool ordinary least squares (OLS) by
rejecting the null hypothesis of absence of fixed effects.
The explanatory variables include the levels of the various
types of subsidy received by farms, aggregated into three cat-
egories: (i) investment subsidies; (ii) production subsidies;
and (iii) rural development subsidies. Investment subsidies
are received to implement specific investments on the farm.
Production subsidies are subsidies linked to agricultural pro-
duction. The category used here consists of area payments for
specific crops cultivated, payments per animal for specific
livestock bred and the decoupled SFP. It is up to each EU
Member State to decide which types of crop and livestock
are subsidised with per-unit payments. During the period con-
sidered, French farmers could receive such payments for land
cultivated with cereal, oilseed and protein crops and for breed-
ing beef and sheep. The rural development subsidies consid-
ered here consist of AEP and LFA payments. The design of
AEP is also at the Member State’s discretion. In France during
this period, AEP mainly targeted the mitigation of nitrogen
leaching by reducing a farm’s livestock density and/or nitro-
gen inputs to crops and promoted the development of grazing
livestock systems and the conversion to organic farming.
Production subsidies and rural development subsidies togeth-
er make operational subsidies, that is to say subsidies provided
for current farm operations, in contrast to investment subsi-
dies. The values of the production subsidies and the values of
rural development subsidies are incorporated in the regression
models in real terms as ratios, i.e. per hectare of UAA (for crop
farms) or per livestock equivalent unit (for livestock farms) in
order to control for size effects. Since only a few farms re-
ceived investment subsidies, the explanatory variable used is
not the farm’s value of the subsidies, but a dummy variable
taking the value one if the farm received some investments
subsidies, and zero if it received none.
Other explanatory variables include the following: yearly
dummies; regional dummies to control for other localisation
effects;5 an extensification proxy for farms specialising in
livestock production, namely the number of UAA hectares
available per livestock unit; and two dummies classifying
farms according to their size. In agriculture, there is no con-
sensus on a single indicator for farm size, since it depends on
the types of production and technology used on the farm
(Carlin and Crecink, 1979; Lund, 1983). For this reason, three
farm clusters are created on the basis of four size indicators:6
UAA; total labour used on the farm; number of livestock
equivalent units on the farm; and the value of fixed assets in
real terms. In order to avoid small coefficients in the
econometric results, all subsidy variables are given in
thousand euros per hectare or per livestock unit, and
the extensification variable is given in hundred hectares
per livestock unit.
Determinants of either productivity change index are inves-
tigated with OLS regressions (five regressions per farm sam-
ple). Individual effect specifications were tested but rejected
by the tests. It should be noted that the explanatory variables
that explain an index of change between period t and period
t+1 are the ones observed in period t.
Data
The farm-level data used for the period 1990–2006 were ex-
tracted from the EU Farm Accountancy Data Network
(FADN) database. This database consists of yearly accounting
data for commercial farms, rotating over a 5-year period at the
maximum. We categorised farms according to their product
specialisation since technology differs across specialisations,
and the type and amount of subsidies differed depending on
the farms’ production specialisation. We focused specifically
on three groups of farms depending on their production spe-
cialisation, based on the EU standard classification of ‘Type of
Farming’ (TF). The criterion for farms’ classification is that at
least 66 % of their gross margin must come from the specific
production of the TF. Here, the analyses are carried out for
field crop farms (TF1), dairy farms (TF41) and beef cattle
rearing and fattening farms (TF42). Only farms appearing in
the FADN database for at least two consecutive years are kept
for the analyses, so that Malmquist indices can be calculated.
The three samples used in this paper are therefore unbalanced
panels.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics of the data used.
During the period studied, on average, dairy farms were just
over half the size of field crop farms (62.6 vs. 120.7 ha), but
used as much labour (1.68 vs. 1.67 AWU). Beef cattle farms
used, on average, the least labour of all three specialisations
(1.46 AWU) but had the highest fixed asset value. Regarding
4 As explained above, due to bootstrapping, the distributions of TE scores
and of PTE scores are not truncated at one. Regarding SE scores, the low
shares of farms with an SE score of one (2.6, 3.6 and 7.5 % for the field
crop, dairy farm and beef cattle samples, respectively) did not imply the
need to resort to truncated regressions.
5 Namely 20 administrative regional dummies at the NUTS2-level of the
European territorial classification NUTS (see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Nomenclature_of_territorial_
units_for_statistics_%28NUTS%29).
6 Farms are partitioned with K-means algorithm where the number of
groups (clusters) is specified by the researcher (here, three), and the clus-
ters are obtained based on the distance between farms in terms of the four
size indicators.
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total subsidies, the field crop sample was the most highly
subsidised in terms of value per farm (30,928 euros per farm
per year on average). But when related to the value of output,
beef cattle farmers received the highest level of subsidies, with
an average ratio of 0.466 (vs. 0.338 for field crop farms) indi-
cating that for every euro produced, 0.466 euro in subsidies
was received on average. The dairy sample was the least
subsidised on average (ratio of 0.108). The same ranking of
samples is observed for operational subsidies (i.e. production
subsidies plus rural development subsidies) and for produc-
tion subsidies. By contrast, rural development subsidies were
mostly received by beef cattle farms both in value per farm
(3223 euros per year) and in relation to the output (a ratio of
0.081). The least subsidised farms in terms of rural develop-
ment subsidies were field crop farms (329 euros per year and a
ratio of 0.004). This is intuitive for two reasons: firstly, during
the period studied, agri-environmental schemes in France
were mostly designed for livestock farms, which therefore
received more AEP; and secondly, field crop farms are mostly
located in the plains while LFAs mainly include hilly or
mountainous areas, and therefore, crop farms receive less in
LFA payments. Investment subsidies accounted for a small
share of total subsidies in all three samples. Only 7.9 % of
the field crop farms, 14.7 % of the dairy farms and 18.6 % of
the beef cattle farms were recipients of investment subsidies
during the period considered.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the data used: 1990–2006
Field crop farms Dairy farms Beef cattle farms
Number of observations during the period 1990–2006 27,931 15,953 8,142
Variables used in efficiency and productivity change calculations (farm averages)
Total output (euros) 110,233 86,422 52,058
UAA (hectares) 120.7 62.6 90.0
Total labour input (AWU) 1.67 1.68 1.46
Fixed assets (Euros) 150,997 148,712 165,597
Intermediate consumption (Euros) 67,086 50,462 35,177
Other variables
Farm averages, per year, over 1990–2006
Total subsidies (investment, production and rural development subsidies)
In euros 30,928 9,538 21,388
As a ratio to total output 0.338 0.108 0.466
1. Total subsidies on investments
In euros 366 1,039 1,030
As a ratio to total output 0.004 0.011 0.023
2. Total operational subsidies (production and rural development subsidies)
In euros 30,562 8,499 20,358
As a ratio to total output 0.334 0.098 0.443
2.1. Production subsidies
In euros 30,233 6,940 17,134
As a ratio to total output 0.330 0.076 0.362
2.2. Rural development subsidies
In euros 329 1,559 3,223
As a ratio to total output 0.004 0.022 0.081
Livestock equivalent units 14.2 75.1 101.0
UAA per livestock unit (hectares) – 0.88 0.94
Shares of farms during 1990–2006
Share of farms in small-size cluster (%) 67.7 58.3 56.1
Share of farms in medium-size cluster (%) 25.6 32.1 32.9
Share of farms in large-size cluster (%) 6.7 9.6 11.0
Share of farms receiving subsidies on investments (%) 7.9 14.7 18.6
Livestock equivalent units: calculated with the standard EU coefficients applied to each type of livestock on the farm. All monetary values are in real
terms
UAA utilised agricultural area, AWU annual working units (1 AWU is equivalent to 2200 h labour per year)
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Results
Technical efficiency scores and productivity change
indices
As shown in Table 2, during 1990–2006, the field crop sample
had on average the lowest TE (average score of 0.499). Dairy
farms performed best on average with an average TE of 0.669,
while the average TE score for beef cattle farms was 0.544. A
similar ranking is observed for PTE. In terms of SE, field crop
farms and beef cattle farms performed similarly, while dairy
farms had the highest average. The low efficiency averages for
field crop farms suggest higher heterogeneity among these
farms than among livestock farms. This finding conforms to
intuition: crop farms tend to havemore heterogeneous soil and
climatic conditions than do livestock farms, while input qual-
ity (in particular land quality) is not captured in the input data
used. During the period, the average TE changes were 0.975,
0.998 and 0.981, respectively. All change index averages are
less than one, suggesting deterioration of the performance
during the period studied. However, figures indicate average
indices around 0.98, that is to say an average decrease of 2 %
for the yearly scores between 1 year and the next.
Table 3 shows the efficiency score averages during the four
periods and results of the tests comparing the scores across the
periods. For the field crop sample, the highest efficiency on
average (whether TE or PTE) was in the benchmark period
(Period 1, during 1990–1994) that is to say before any CAP
reformwas implemented, followed by a decrease in efficiency
during the next period. TE and PTE then decreased again in
the next periods, the lowest efficiency averages being attained
in 2006 (Period 4), the year where the 2003 CAP reform was
implemented with the introduction of the decoupled SFP. By
contrast, SE reached its maximum average level during Period
4. Similarly to field crop farms, for both dairy and beef cattle
farm samples efficiency (whether TE, PTE or SE) decreased
on average following the first CAP reform implementation.
All types of efficiency increased again afterwards (Period 3,
which is the Agenda 2000 implementation period) for both
samples. They decreased again in 2006 (Period 4, which is
the 2003 reform implementation) for the dairy farm sample. A
small decrease is also observed for PTE for the beef farm
sample, but no significant change is observed for TE and SE
between Period 3 and Period 4.
Table 4 reports average change indices during the different
periods as well as the comparison tests’ results. Contrary to
that observed in Table 3 for TE and PTE yearly scores whose
average in Period 2 was lower than the average in Period 1, the
opposite is observed for the change indices in TE and PTE for
the three samples: the average changes in TE and PTE in-
creased following the first CAP reform implementation. For
example, for the field crop sample, the average TE change was
a deterioration of −3.6 % before the first CAP reform
implementation (index average of 0.964 in Period 1) while it
was an improvement of +0.3 % after the first reform’s imple-
mentation and before the next reform of Agenda 2000 (index
average of 1.003 in Period 2). In the third period (following
the Agenda 2000 implementation), TE and PTE changes de-
creased again on average for the field crop and dairy samples
(e.g. average deterioration of −4.1 % for the field crop sample)
and remained the same for the beef cattle sample. In contrast
to TE and PTE changes, between Periods 1 and 2, technolog-
ical change worsened substantially for the two livestock sam-
ples, going from technological progress for beef cattle farms
(+2.6 % on average) or no change for dairy farm (average
index of 1.000) to technological deterioration (−1.7 and
−3.1 % on average, respectively). The worsening pattern con-
tinued for the beef cattle sample between Periods 2 and 3,
while it was held back for the dairy sample with a reduction
in technological deterioration from −3.1 to −1.2 % on average.
A contrasting picture is observed for field crop farms, with
virtually no change in average technological deterioration be-
tween Periods 1 and 2, and a transformation into technological
progress (from −3.1 to +2.7 % on average) between Periods 2
and 3. As a result, total productivity deterioration was reduced
on average for field crop farms (i.e. increase in the Malmquist
index average) between Periods 1 and 2, but remained un-
changed for the livestock samples. Between Periods 2 and 3,
total productivity deterioration worsened for the dairy sample.
The impact of subsidies
Tables 5 and 6 present the econometric results, for all three
samples, of the investigation into the determinants of the three
efficiency variables using fixed individual effect regressions
and the various productivity change indices using OLS.
Regarding the subsidies, results in Table 5 show a variety of
effects of these on efficiency: positive, negative and non-sig-
nificant. The effect of production subsidies on TE and PTE is
consistently negative for all three samples. It is also negative
on SE for field crop farms, but non-significant for the two
livestock samples. Rural development subsidies had no sig-
nificant effect on TE for all three samples. However, the pic-
ture is different when looking at TE’s components: such sub-
sidies had no effect on the PTE of both livestock samples, but
a positive effect on the PTE of field crop farms; they had a
negative effect on the SE of field crop and dairy farms but no
effect on the SE of beef farms. Farms that received investment
subsidies had a lower TE within the field crop and dairy sam-
ples, and a lower PTE within the dairy sample only. The other
effects for such subsidies are not significant.
In contrast to Table 5, Table 6 shows that production sub-
sidies had a positive impact on TE change, PTE change and
Malmquist total productivity change for field crop and dairy
farms (as well on SE change for field crop farms). The other
impacts are not significant, except for a negative one on
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technological change for beef cattle farms. Rural development
subsidies show either a non-significant impact or a positive
impact (for PTE, SE, technological and total productivity
changes of field crop farms, and for PTE and total productivity
changes of dairy farms). The effect of investment subsidies
was almost always not significant; the only exception being
for beef cattle farms, whose recipients saw their TE change
being worsened.
Other results from the regressions indicate that large farms
were the most efficient in the field crop sample and the least
efficient in the dairy and beef cattle samples, in terms of TE
and PTE (Table 5). This is reversed when looking at PTE
change: large farms, along with small farms, had the lowest
PTE change in the field crop sample, while they had the
highest PTE change in both livestock samples (Table 6).
Regarding technological change, it was similar whatever the
size cluster in both livestock samples, but highest for small
farms in the field crop sample. Table 5 indicates that for both
livestock samples, being extensive (i.e. having a large UAA
per livestock unit) does not generally favour either TE, PTE or
SE (though note that the effect is not significant for the SE
beef cattle farms). The effect of extensification degree is gen-
erally not significant on change indices, except for a negative
effect on SE change and a positive effect on technological
Table 2 Average efficiency








Number of observations for efficiency calculations 27,931 15,953 8,142
Average efficiency scores
TE score 0.499 0.669 0.544
PTE score 0.531 0.696 0.588
SE score 0.928 0.952 0.922
Number of observations for productivity change
calculations
26,338 15,175 7,604
Average productivity change indices
TE change index 0.975 0.998 0.981
PTE change index 0.976 0.998 0.981
SE change index 0.991 0.997 0.989
Technological change index 0.997 0.986 0.994
Malmquist productivity change index 0.976 0.986 0.983
The averages of productivity change indices are the geometrical means
Table 3 Efficiency averages in the different periods, and tests of equality of means between periods
Average efficiency score during: Test of equality of means between:
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4 Periods Periods Periods Periods
1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2005 2006 1 and 2 2 and 3 3 and 4 1 and 4
Field crop farms
TE 0.527 0.493 0.489 0.459 *** * *** ***
PTE 0.555 0.526 0.523 0.486 *** ns *** ***
SE 0.936 0.924 0.923 0.943 *** ns *** ***
Dairy farms
TE 0.673 0.634 0.696 0.650 *** *** *** ***
PTE 0.690 0.675 0.719 0.689 *** *** *** ns
SE 0.963 0.935 0.958 0.938 *** *** *** ***
Beef cattle farms
TE 0.577 0.520 0.540 0.529 *** *** ns ***
PTE 0.608 0.567 0.591 0.574 *** *** ** ***
SE 0.941 0.916 0.914 0.917 *** *** ns ***
t tests were performed for TE and PTE, while Mann-Whitney tests were performed for SE
ns difference not significant
*, **, ***: difference significant at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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change for dairy farms (Table 6). Yearly dummies show that TE
decreased continuously from 1999 to 2006 for field crop farms
and from 1995 to 2004 for beef cattle farms (Table 5). For dairy
farms, TE increased from the start of 2000 and did not decrease
during the period under consideration. The total productivity
change also continuously worsened for field crop farms during
the whole period except in 2005–2006 (Table 6). For both live-
stock samples, the picture is not so smooth, with increases and
decreases in total productivity change observed during the period.
Discussion
The econometric results show a variety of effects from subsidies.
Tables 7 and 8 present a summary of the results in terms of the
sign of the effect of the three types of subsidy on the three farm
samples. The provision of investment subsidies generally has no
significant effect, with the exception of a negative effect on field
crop farms’ TE, dairy farms’ TE and PTE and beef cattle farms’
TE change. Production subsidies generally have a negative effect
on efficiency, except for no significant effect on livestock farms’
SE. They had no significant effect on beef cattle farms except for
a negative effect on the technical change index. However, they
have a positive effect on productivity changes for field crop and
dairy farms, except for no significant effect on technological
change for both samples and on SE change for dairy farms.
Rural development subsidies have no effect on TE and TE
change for all three samples. Also, they have no effect on effi-
ciency or change indices for beef cattle farms. For dairy farms,
there is only a negative effect on SE and a positive effect on PTE
change and on technological change, the rest of the effects being
non-significant. As for field crop farms, except for no significant
effect on TE and TE change and a negative effect on SE, the
other effects are positive.
The finding of so many significant effects of rural devel-
opment subsidies for field crop farms compared to the live-
stock sample may be surprising, since the latter received fewer
of these subsidies. The low share of field crop farms receiving
such subsidies in our sample (8 compared to 29 and 54 % for
the dairy and beef cattle farm samples, respectively) may be
one explanation. Re-running the regressions for the field crop
sample, with a dummy variable (taking the value one if the
farm received such subsidies and zero otherwise) instead of
the value of the subsidies, shows that the positive effect on
PTE and on PTE change is confirmed, while the other effects
are not significant, except for a new positive effect on TE.
Table 4 Average indices in the different periods, and tests of equality of means between periods
Average change index
during:
Test of equality of
means between:
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Periods Periods Periods
1990–1994 1995–1999 2000–2005 1 and 2 2 and 3 1 and 3
Field crop farms
TE change index 0.964 1.003 0.959 *** *** ns
PTE change index 0.965 1.009 0.956 *** *** **
SE change index 0.990 0.988 0.995 ns *** ***
Technological change index 0.978 0.979 1.027 ns *** ***
Malmquist productivity change index 0.946 0.987 0.990 *** ns ***
Dairy farms
TE change index 0.989 1.021 0.987 *** *** ns
PTE change index 0.990 1.016 0.991 *** *** ns
SE change index 0.996 1.002 0.992 *** *** ns
Technological change index 1.000 0.969 0.988 *** *** ***
Malmquist productivity change index 0.991 0.992 0.977 ns *** ***
Beef cattle farms
TE change index 0.947 0.997 0.997 *** ns ***
PTE change index 0.945 0.992 0.999 *** ns ***
SE change index 0.992 0.993 0.985 * *** ***
Technological change index 1.026 0.983 0.979 *** *** ***
Malmquist productivity change index 0.980 0.987 0.982 ns ns ns
Mann-Whitney tests were performed
ns difference not significant
*, **, ***: difference significant at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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The fact that production subsidies have a consistently neg-
ative effect on TE and PTE for all three samples confirms the
literature’s general finding. As explained above, one explana-
tion may be farmers’ reduced effort, as suggested by Martin
and Page (1983) or a change in farmers’ risk attitudes (Serra
et al., 2008). However, another explanation might be that
farmers implement changes in their practices that lead to a
reduction in their efficiency in the same year, but that enable
improving efficiency over time. This is suggested by the pos-
itive effect of production subsidies on efficiency changes and
Table 5 Econometric results of the determinants of efficiency (fixed effect model)
Field crop farms Dairy farms Beef cattle farms
TE PTE SE TE PTE SE TE PTE SE
Dummy=1 if year 1991 −0.0146*** 0.0063* −0.0337*** 0.0163*** 0.0092*** 0.0093*** −0.0481*** −0.0229*** −0.0351***
Dummy=1 if year 1992 0.0260*** 0.0186*** 0.0145*** 0.0138*** 0.0072* 0.0059*** −0.0869*** −0.0455*** −0.0560***
Dummy=1 if year 1993 0.0014na 0.0187*** −0.0232*** 0.0260*** 0.0243*** 0.0033 0.0134 0.0070 0.0103*
Dummy=1 if year 1994 −0.0231*** −0.0317*** 0.0160*** 0.0350*** 0.0311*** 0.0073*** 0.0340*** 0.0225** 0.0155**
Dummy=1 if year 1995 −0.0280*** −0.0233*** −0.0030na −0.0083** 0.0100** −0.0225*** −0.0764*** −0.0420*** −0.0487***
Dummy=1 if year 1996 −0.0710*** −0.0572*** −0.0207*** 0.0177*** 0.0417*** −0.0259*** −0.0551*** −0.0427*** −0.0208***
Dummy=1 if year 1997 0.0041na 0.0135** −0.0122*** −0.0004 0.0039 −0.0016 −0.0919*** −0.0810*** −0.0291***
Dummy=1 if year 1998 −0.0033na 0.0121** −0.0254*** −0.0549*** −0.0363*** −0.0275*** −0.0506*** −0.0251** −0.0368***
Dummy=1 if year 1999 −0.0229*** −0.0191*** −0.0111*** −0.0528*** −0.0284*** −0.0314*** −0.1016*** −0.0829*** −0.0316***
Dummy=1 if year 2000 −0.0202*** 0.0005na −0.0317*** 0.0299*** 0.0262*** 0.0059** −0.1023*** −0.0821*** −0.0383***
Dummy=1 if year 2001 −0.0559*** −0.0491*** −0.0170*** 0.0277*** 0.0250*** 0.0033 −0.0838*** −0.0683*** −0.0235***
Dummy=1 if year 2002 −0.0587*** −0.0328*** −0.0394*** 0.0758*** 0.0592*** 0.0172*** −0.0702*** −0.0349*** −0.0439***
Dummy=1 if year 2003 −0.0621*** −0.0534*** −0.0200*** 0.0462*** 0.0490*** −0.0066** −0.0730*** −0.0414*** −0.0637***
Dummy=1 if year 2004 −0.0231*** −0.0201*** −0.0045na 0.0414*** 0.0284*** 0.0128*** −0.0640*** −0.0363*** −0.0297***
Dummy=1 if year 2005 −0.0300*** −0.0359*** 0.0131*** 0.0021 0.0108** −0.0157*** 0.0373*** 0.0311** 0.0063




−0.0035* −0.0030na −0.0007na −0.0077*** −0.0071*** −0.0008 −0.0014 −0.0019 0.0004
Value received of
production subsidies
per hectare of UAA or
per livestock unit
−0.2131*** −0.2060*** −0.0418*** −0.1102*** −0.1171*** 0.0086 −0.1052*** −0.0803** −0.0334
Value received of rural
development
subsidies per hectare
of UAA or per
livestock unit
−0.0010na 0.0963* −0.1720*** −0.0176 0.0286 −0.0513*** −0.0297 −0.0051 −0.0536
UAA per livestock unit −2.7314*** −2.5179*** −0.7036* −3.0216*** −2.6596** −0.7883
Dummy=1 if farm in
medium-size cluster
and 0 otherwise
−0.0247*** −0.0278*** 0.0045** −0.0172*** −0.0191*** 0.0032 −0.0029 −0.0016 0.0010
Dummy=1 if farm in
large-size cluster and
0 otherwise
0.0095** 0.0050na 0.0084** −0.0357*** −0.0220*** −0.0188*** −0.0343*** −0.0001 −0.0474***
Number of observations 27,931 27,931 27,931 15,953 15,953 15,953 8142 8142 8142
R square 0.2076 0.1746 0.0828 0.1808 0.1050 0.1166 0.1774 0.0959 0.1112
Model’s F statistic 290.1*** 234.4*** 100.0*** 127.3*** 67.7*** 76.1*** 62.8*** 30.9*** 36.4***
F test of absence of fixed
effects
11.7*** 10.9*** 5.7*** 6.8*** 6.7*** 4.2*** 5.0*** 4.6*** 3.2***
Results for the regional dummies are not shown. The value of subsidies is per hectare of UAA for the field crop sample and per livestock unit for the dairy
and beef cattle samples
n.a not applicable
*, **, ***: significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % levels, respectively
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total productivity changes for field crop and dairy farms, as
found by Guyomard et al. (2006) and Zheng and Kening
(2011). Production subsidies, which can be considered
as additional cash flow to the farms, may help farmers
by lifting their financial constraints and thus allowing
them to purchase different inputs that lead, over the
longer term, to higher efficiency.
Being a recipient of investment subsidies was not found to
favour efficiency, but rather had a negative impact for field
crop and dairy farms and no significant impact for beef cattle
farms. The impact is also consistently not significant on the
year-to-year efficiency change, technological and productivity
change (except for a negative impact on TE change for beef
cattle farms). One reason for such negative or non-significant
effects may be that, while such subsidies are used to
implement new technology, acquiring the know - how to use
this technology in an efficient way takes time. However, it
should also be mentioned here that some effects are found to
be different if the value of subsidies is considered in the ex-
planatory variables, instead of the dummy indicating whether
the farm has received non-zero subsidies. The effect of the
value of subsidies is not significant for all efficiency variables
and all samples. Also, the negative effect identified on TE
change for beef cattle farms is not significant with the subsidy
values. By contrast, the effect on total productivity change for
field crop farms becomes significant, the sign being positive.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the efficiency-
subsidy relationship, by empirically investigating the effects
of three types of subsidies (investment subsidies, production
subsidies and rural development subsidies) on French farms’
TE and productivity change during the period 1990–2006 for
three types of farms: field crop farms, dairy farms and beef
cattle farms.
Several main findings can be highlighted. First, following
the first CAP reform implementation (the 1992 MacSharry
reform) when area and livestock headage payments were in-
troduced for the first time, efficiency for all three farm samples
considered decreased on average. By contrast, efficiency
change improved on average. Technological change worsened
for both livestock samples but remained unchanged for field
crop farms on average. As a result, total productivity change
improved for field crop farms and remained unchanged for
both livestock samples. These observations suggest that lim-
iting the investigation of the effect of public subsidies to
Table 7 Summary of the effect of subsidies on farms’ efficiency scores
TE PTE SE
Investment subsidies
Field crop farms – n.s. n.s.
Dairy farms – – n.s.
Beef cattle farms n.s. n.s. n.s.
Production subsidies
Field crop farms – – –
Dairy farms – – n.s.
Beef cattle farms – – n.s.
Rural development subsidies
Field crop farms n.s. + –
Dairy farms n.s. n.s. –
Beef cattle farms n.s. n.s. n.s.
+, –, n.s.: effect of the subsidies on efficiency is positive, negative and not
significant, respectively
Table 8 Summary of the effect of subsidies on farms’ productivity change indices





Field crop farms n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Dairy farms n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Beef cattle farms – n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Production subsidies
Field crop farms + + + n.s. +
Dairy farms + + n.s. n.s. +
Beef cattle farms n.s. n.s. n.s. – n.s.
Rural development subsidies
Field crop farms n.s. + + + +
Dairy farms n.s. + n.s. n.s. +
Beef cattle farms n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
+, –, n.s.: effect of the subsidies on efficiency is positive, negative, and not significant, respectively
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yearly efficiency may provide a narrow picture, and that anal-
yses need to be carried out in a broader way. There are two
ways of achieving this: (i) by investigating longer periods:
while short term results may show a deterioration of farms’
performance, in the longer term the effects may be positive;
(ii) by investigating several dimensions of performance,
namely yearly efficiency, efficiency change and total produc-
tivity change.
Second, econometric results regarding the effect of subsi-
dies are ambiguous. The effect of a particular type of subsidy
was found not significant, negative or positive depending on
the sample’s production specialisation and on the efficiency
variable considered, confirming Serra et al. (2008) suggestion
and Minviel and Latruffe (2014) meta-analysis results on var-
ious analysis contexts. Therefore, our findings highlight the
fact that systemic policy recommendations cannot be drawn
without a precise context specification. For example, the im-
pact of a policy on farms with a given production specialisa-
tion may differ from the impact on other types of farms, sug-
gesting that it may not be possible to generalise conclusions
drawn from analyses on one production sector to the whole
farming sector.
Third, receiving investment subsidies was found to favour
neither a farm’s yearly efficiency nor year-to-year productivity
change. This suggests a necessary delay between the moment
where subsidies are received (and the new technology imple-
mented), and the moment where the new technology is fully
operational. From a methodological point of view, it may
therefore be more relevant to assess the effect of past (instead
of current) investment subsidies on current or future
efficiency.
Fourth, our findings regarding production subsidies
confirm the existing literature about a decrease in efficien-
cy due to such subsidies, but point to a positive effect on
efficiency and productivity changes. This suggests that
such subsidies may enable farmers to relax their financial
constraints and purchase inputs that can make a difference
to the output achieved the following year. Hence, while
most of the efficiency-subsidy research has focused on the
immediate effect of subsidies, we recommend that further
empirical research is undertaken regarding the effect of
subsidies on TE change to confirm or contradict such
findings.
Fifth, the results regarding rural development subsidies
(namely LFA payments and AEP) show a complex picture,
with many non-significant effects, some positive effects and a
few negative effects. LFA payments, granted to farms solely
because they are located in unfavourable agroecological areas,
may therefore keep inefficient farms in the sector. However,
by favouring the presence of farms, these subsidies may help
maintain agricultural land in good conditions in such areas.
AEP are provided when environmental-friendly practices are
implemented on the farm, which may necessitate additional
labour while no increase in output is generated. Therefore, a
methodological suggestion for future research would be to
include an environmental output when calculating efficiency
and investigating the effect of rural development subsidies on
such efficiency.
Finally, modelling the subsidies either as the value received
by the farm, or as a dummy variable capturing whether the
farm was a recipient or not, may not provide the same find-
ings. This was evident here for investment subsidies, and for
rural development subsidies in the case of field crop farms.
The effect may change from significant to non-significant and,
inversely, a non-significant effect may become significantly
positive. This suggests a selection effect, and Heckman
models could be used in future research, where the effect of
subsidies is investigated in two stages: on receiving the sub-
sidies, and on the efficiency of the subsidies’ recipients.
Threshold effects may also be investigated, that is to say the
level of subsidies that triggers an effect on efficiency.
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